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Abstract:





This paper compares the post-Cold War restructuring of the defense industries in the United States (US) and Europe with the aim of understanding the implications for the transatlantic industrial base.  The process of restructuring gives us a sense of the strategic vision of the private and public sectors, and the opportunities for partnerships at the corporate and military procurement levels.  However, the main argument presented here is that the armaments market is significantly different than other markets for goods and services, and that political and economic obstacles in Europe and the US go a long way in explaining why a truly transatlantic defense industrial base has been so difficult to create.  Consequently, the paper will examine the roles that political actors (including the European Union, or EU) and industry officials play in shaping the developments in this sector.  We conclude that the present ‘bipolar defense industrial base,’ and the lack of political will to change this, is detrimental to transatlantic relations, and is responsible for much of the ‘capability gap’ among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. 

POST-COLD WAR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The end of the Cold War forced defense firms around the globe to adapt to a dramatically different operating environment.  With defense spending plummeting in almost every country, defense companies had few options.  They could: merge with or acquire other firms in the hope that economies of scale and scope would ensure their survival; find or develop new export markets; diversify into other sectors that were less dependent on government defense contracts; or go out of business, in effect, by selling themselves to the highest bidder.  US and European defense firms pursued each of these strategies, but the timing, pace, and industrial structure varied considerably.

United States
Historically, the engine of growth for the US defense industry was strong domestic demand, fueled by the Cold War.  Times were especially prosperous for the industry from the late 1970s through the late 1980s.  By the early 1990s, however, the tide had turned.  As the defense budget was slashed in search of a ‘peace dividend’, the US defense industry realized that the golden years of the Reagan buildup were over.  Military spending declined from $422 billion in 1989 to $290 billion in 1999 (in constant 2000 dollars), with the steepest decline coming in the mid-1990s.​[1]​  Prodded in 1993 by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the industry hastened to adjust.​[2]​  Layoffs by firms such as Northrop, Hughes, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Litton Industries, and TRW marked a spate of ‘downsizings’ and acquisitions, culminating in the mergers of Lockheed and Martin Marietta, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, and Raytheon and Hughes.  A 2003 Pentagon report found that the 50 largest defense suppliers of the early 1980s have become today’s top five contractors.​[3]​  
US firms now dominate the global defense industry: six of the top ten defense companies in the world are based in the US, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics (see Table 1).  The US defense industry – or at least the aerospace and electronics components of it – consolidated quickly, but with the strong urging of the Pentagon.  Most of the mergers occurred between 1993-1998.  Major defense contractors have pursued three strategies since the late 1990s: buying relatively small defense units from diversified US conglomerates (like General Motors and TRW); acquiring defense-related businesses outside of aerospace and electronics (such as information technology or shipbuilding); or expanding abroad by buying foreign defense firms.  The first strategy has been just about exhausted at this point in time.  The second strategy is likely to continue to be popular, especially in a post-9-11 world where the US government is spending considerable sums on Homeland Security, intelligence, and surveillance.  It is the third strategy that is the most difficult to predict or pursue, especially since most of the smaller European defense firms have now been acquired by larger European or US companies.  The next step for US firms would be to acquire or merge with large European companies – a much more significant development than the ad hoc alliances and collaborations that often arise with large multination weapons systems.  But, as will be made clear below, the obstacles to this strategy are formidable.

Europe
Europe’s defense industry began the 1990s as a collection of national defense fiefdoms.  While the US defense industry was rapidly consolidating during the first half of the decade, most European firms continued to look inward.  European consolidation at this time took the form of large national defense champions acquiring small domestic firms (a strategy pursued by Germany’s Daimler-Benz), or big companies acquiring targets in countries with minor defense industries (e.g., France’s Thomson-CSF purchasing the defense electronics business of the Dutch Philips).  Transnational collaborations that did exist generally took the form of joint ventures (for products like missiles) or multinational consortia (like the Eurofighter) – both of which enabled defense firms to maintain their national independence.  Large-scale cross-border mergers were hindered by the reluctance to see a domestic company acquired by a foreign firm.  This concern was most evident in the political realm, as national governments worried about the loss of sovereignty (particularly the insecurity that armaments may not be readily available) and the political consequences of restructuring-induced job losses that might accompany such an acquisition.  However, defense firms were almost as resistant to industry-wide rationalization.  Many executives feared the uncertainty that would follow mergers with respect to the cozy relationships they had cultivated through the years with their ‘home’ defense ministry.  The extent to which these links would be weakened by Europe-wide industrial restructuring was unclear.  The status quo was the safest option for both government and business.
	By the late 1990s, this situation became untenable.  Given the consolidation in the US and the political impetus for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the European Union (EU), European defense firms found themselves under political and economic pressure to consolidate.  The first major consolidation occurred in the United Kingdom in January 1999, when GEC agreed to sell its defense arm (Marconi Electronic Systems) to British Aerospace.  The new entity was renamed BAE Systems.  Nine months later a European defense giant was born.  The first step, as in the UK, was national consolidation.  As part of its privatization in June 1999, France’s Aérospatiale joined with Matra to create an aerospace and defense electronics powerhouse.  Four months later, this combined entity merged with Dasa to form European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS).  CASA, Spain’s leading aerospace and defense firm, also merged into EADS.
	Similar consolidation occurred in related sectors.  In October 1997, the French government announced that it would privatize Thomson-CSF, and bring Dassault Electronique, the space and defense electronics businesses of Alcatel, and the satellite businesses of Aérospatiale within the company.  Thomson-CSF acquired Racal Electronics of the UK in June 2000 and was renamed Thales.  Two companies now account for Europe’s helicopter business: Eurocopter (a division of EADS) and AgustaWestland (which combined the helicopter interests within Italy and the UK).  MBDA, the world’s second-largest maker of missiles (behind Raytheon), was formed in 2003 by merging the missile interests of EADS, BAE Systems, and Finmeccanica.
	Table 2 shows that BAE Systems dominates Europe’s defense industry, while EADS and Thales each have roughly half the defense revenues of BAE Systems.  As described above, the paths of these mergers appear to represent two different strategies of consolidation.  BAE Systems is the result of the consolidation of much of the UK’s national defense infrastructure into one company, without any major cross-border ties.  EADS, on the other hand, was formed via a ‘merger of mergers’, thereby producing a company that would be in a stronger position to negotiate transnational ventures.  It is significant that the momentum to create EADS was driven not by national leaders, but by corporate executives who made a conscious and calculated decision to keep their respective national leaders uninformed of the plans, until the advanced stage of the negotiation.​[4]​  By such unusual discretion, political meddling in what was essentially a business decision was kept to a minimum.
BAE Systems, which may at first glance look like a ‘national champion’, instead may be a test case of a new breed of firm: a genuine transatlantic defense company.  One reason British Aerospace opted to merge with GEC rather than Dasa was to own Tracor, GEC’s largest subsidiary in the US.  As discussed below, merger talks between BAE Systems and US firms have intensified in recent months.  British firms have long enjoyed preferential access to US firms and technology.  Such access is critical today, as US officials after September 11, 2001 are even more anxious about the possibility of sophisticated technology falling into enemy hands by way of European defense contractors.  The British are trusted with technology, and are allowed to buy into the US market, in a way that the French and Germans are not.​[5]​ 
In the case of both EADS and BAE Systems, the Europeans have formed defense titans that can finally match their US counterparts.  With the exception of land vehicles producers and aircraft engine makers, there is little left to consolidate within Europe.  DCN, the French ship maker, is likely to be controlled by the state for some time.  However, Noelle Lenoir, France’s European minister, suggests that the project of creating a pan-European shipbuilder along the lines of EADS is important to the French and German governments.​[6]​  But US and European firms so dominate the global armaments market that there are few remaining opportunities for non-organic revenue growth.
	The global trend is toward consolidation among national defense firms or developing strategic alliances with US or European companies.  In 1990, the world’s ten largest defense companies comprised just 37 percent of global weapons sales.  By 2000, the world’s ten largest defense firms were responsible for 58 percent of international arms sales.​[7]​  Only within the European region have significant steps been taken toward cross-border rationalization.  Much of this can be explained by the wider economic restructuring that Europe has experienced over the past 20 years.​[8]​  The EU’s Single European Act (SEA) was a driving force in the efforts to make European firms more competitive at the global level, and the results spilled over into the defense sector.  But economics can only go so far in shaping an industry whose foundation is ultimately political.

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
While the economic environment may be ripe for transatlantic opportunities, political considerations pose formidable obstacles in both the US and Europe.  

United States
As indicated in Table 3, US defense spending dipped by more than 31 percent between 1989 and 1999.  However, in just four years, spending has returned to 1989 levels.  Today, the Pentagon accounts for almost half of global defense spending.​[9]​  This figure may increase if budgetary projections hold up.  Congress approved a $416 billion fiscal 2005 defense funding measure, which contained a record $70 billion for research and development (R&D) – 20 percent above the peak levels of President Reagan’s historic defense buildup in the 1980s.​[10]​  Tens of billions more out of $78 billion allocated for procurement will go for big-ticket weapons systems.  Financing the activities of US troops in Iraq and force modernization are expected to push defense spending to nearly $500 billion in 2005, above the inflation-adjusted Cold War average, and $50 billion above 2004.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the long-term price tag for all the planes, ships, and weapons the military services want will be at least $770 billion above what the Bush administration’s long-term defense plan calls for.
	Industrial consolidation within the US is virtually complete.  The five largest defense firms so dominate Pentagon procurement, that further consolidation among them would weaken the competitive bidding process to an unacceptable level.  Some critics argue that consolidation has already gone too far, and has eliminated the virtues of competition.  The logical next step would be to include more non-US firms in the procurement process, including transatlantic mergers.  Yet, the obstacles are significant.  Ron Sugar, chairman and chief executive of Northrop Grumman, probably reflects the view of many government, military, and industry officials when he says, ‘We’re not just making toothpaste, we’re in the business of national security.  National borders do matter’.​[11]​  
Had US defense industry consolidation been pursued to its logical conclusion, Northrop Grumman would have been acquired by Lockheed Martin or Boeing.  In fact, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman agreed to a merger in 1997, and it was widely assumed that the US government would approve the merger, it being the last logical step in the Defense Department’ goal of consolidation.  With one acquisition following another, however, those in both the defense and justice departments had become increasingly worried about the lack of competition in the defense marketplace.​[12]​  In 1998, the US government announced that it would oppose the merger on the grounds that consolidation was beginning to compromise competition in the contracting process.  However, this conclusion was based almost entirely on an understanding of the defense sector as a national market.  Certainly, plenty of non-American suppliers existed, particularly in Europe.  But the political obstacle of viewing military contractors from a global or even transatlantic perspective is daunting.
	How one defines the size of the market is of critical importance.  While leery of more domestic mergers, some officials (in both government and industry) have been quietly floating the idea of an Atlantic partnership.​[13]​   Such an Atlantic merger would need to be supported by the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon, and would have to ensure the safety of key US technologies.  Nevertheless, by expanding the geography of the market, the number of possible competitors is also simultaneously expanded, allowing firms to wring more savings out of consolidation while still allowing the benefits of competition.  BAE Systems is a prime candidate for an inter-continental merger, although Northrop Grumman, is also known to be on the menu of some European firms.  BAE Systems, moreover, has already put in place many of the safeguards US officials would require when it assumed Tracor as part of GEC’s defense business, and acquired Lockheed Martin’s aerospace electronics systems business in 2000.  
The environment for consolidating a transatlantic defense industrial base is currently being poisoned by some US politicians who seem to be going out of their way to antagonize Europe and their defense firms.  Part of this stems from a decades-old interest in protecting defense manufacturing jobs in the US, while a more recent justification is to punish European firms for not supporting the Iraq War.  In September 2003, the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee drafted a controversial bill barring the Pentagon from using overseas suppliers in purchasing parts for essential weapons systems.  Additionally, the US content requirement for Pentagon purchases would increase from 50 to 65 percent.  
The bill provoked a storm of protests from numerous corners.​[14]​  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld opposed the measure on the grounds that it would reduce the Pentagon’s supplier base and cost the department and its US contractors billions of dollars to replace foreign-made machine tools.  Senate Armed Services chairman John Warner opposed the measure, fearing it would lead to retaliation by other countries and jeopardize America’s approximately $50 billion annual trade surplus in aerospace products.  US defense firms and trade groups, including the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), also opposed the bill on the grounds that it would wreak havoc by barring foreign subcontractors in product supply chains, and hamper foreign sales by US defense firms.  In a letter sent to Senator Warner by the AIA and the European Association of Aerospace Industries, the trade groups said such a provision ‘would undermine cross-Atlantic defense industry relationships.’​[15]​  Compliance costs, certifying that US defense contractors did not use foreign parts, also would be burdensome.
The European Commission warned Congress that adoption of legislation urging the Pentagon to buy all essential weapons parts from US manufacturers could spark a new transatlantic trade dispute.​[16]​  The Commission threatened to take their case to the World Trade Organization (WTO) if the final bill contained provisions contrary to WTO rules.  A requirement to purchase only US-made machine tools, for example, would likely violate WTO rules governing government procurement.  Under current laws, 50 percent of a US weapons system must be American-made.​[17]​  The Pentagon fought attempts in 2003 to make the laws more stringent, arguing that would anger allies and increase the cost of some programs.  Just 4.1 percent, or $8.6 billion, of the $209 billion that the Pentagon spent on procurement in fiscal 2003 went to foreign entities.
Given the fragile state of US-Europe economic relations, which has been strained in recent years by disputes over genetically-modified organisms, steel, merger approvals, and subsidies to Airbus and Boeing, another high-profile trade controversy would not be helpful for transatlantic relations.  In the end, Congress kept a Buy America provision in the final defense bill, but does not require the Pentagon to favor US manufacturers.​[18]​  It now only directs the Pentagon to assess the ability of US manufacturers to produce military systems and creates a fund to support them.  It also creates an incentive program to encourage defense contractors to use US machine tools.
In the post 9-11 ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) era, the Pentagon is shifting its spending priorities in ways that probably will not help European defense firms.  With an emphasis on information technology, intelligence, surveillance, communications, and related technologies requiring high levels of security, foreign firms – even European ones – are at a competitive disadvantage for Pentagon contracts, even at the subcontractor level.  Some defense firms are making the necessary changes to fill the needs of anti-terrorism and homeland security.​[19]​  Northrop Grumman expects sales to the US government related to homeland security of at least $500 million.  The US Department of Homeland Security has a faster growing budget than the military defense budget, with investments expected to grow more than 10 percent each year until 2009.  But most European firms will not be trusted to supply these needs.
Some Pentagon and military officials are more interested in including European defense firms in the procurement process than Congress or US defense companies.  In June 2004, Air Force Secretary James Roche warned that consolidation among US contractors had left the Pentagon over-dependent on a small number of key suppliers in certain sectors.​[20]​  He said the main way to correct this is to encourage overseas manufacturers to compete for defense department spending.  He even has gone so far as to encourage EADS to compete if a controversial Air Force tanker refueling contract (originally awarded to Boeing, but rescinded after an ethics scandal) is reopened, especially after the European firm’s victories over Boeing in tanker competitions in the UK and Australia.  EADS has suggested that the company would consider opening production lines in the US, particularly if it were allowed to compete for major US defense contracts.​[21]​  But until there is evidence of this in Washington, production facilities will remain within their respective borders. 
In the current political environment, it is hard to envision the Pentagon purchasing any significant amount of weapons systems from non-US suppliers (BAE Systems excepted for reasons already discussed).  The EU-15 countries have cut dramatically their purchases of US weapons in recent years (see Table 4).  These countries bought $1.4 billion in arms from the United States in 2003, down from $3.5 billion in 2000.  Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004, particularly Poland, have a greater export potential for US defense companies.  However, even this market may prove difficult if membership, and the obligations and policy harmonization that accompanies it, results in ‘New Europe’ becoming more like ‘Old Europe.’​[22]​  At the same time, the share of the international arms market held by US firms has shrunk from 47 percent in 1999 to under 24 percent in 2003 (see Table 5).  Given the decline in European and global purchases of US-made weapons, the US government is going to be very reluctant to increase its spending on European-made equipment.

Europe 
As mentioned above, only the US among the major transatlantic powers has returned to Cold War levels of defense spending.  While most European countries cut their defense spending by a smaller percentage than the US between 1989 and 1999, few have increased spending by any significant amount in response to recent terrorist threats (see Table 3).  Germany and the UK account for a disproportionate amount of spending cuts in Europe.  In the UK, the defense industry lost about 160,000 jobs between 1990 and 1998, when it employed just 260,000.  The drop in Sweden went from 22,782 workers in 1990 to just 14,810 in 2002.  The French sector had 250,100 workers in 1990, but 84,100 fewer in 2000.  However, in the US, approximately 3 million people were employed in arms production in 2003 – just 115,000 less than 1990.​[23]​  
The EU continues to move toward a common defense policy, although the significance and tangibility of agreements varies considerably.  An analysis of ESDP is beyond the scope of this paper.  Suffice it to say that progress toward an ESDP of any meaning will positively influence trans-European consolidation of the defense industry, but may not be helpful for transatlantic relations.  We highlight here those aspects of ESDP that have the potential for significant impact on this sector.
Cooperation in weapons procurement will be a key test for the successful fusion of ESDP and defense industry consolidation.  In September 1998, France, the UK, Germany, and Italy signed an agreement giving a legal identity to the Joint European Armaments Organizations (commonly known by its French acronym – OCCAR).  OCCAR’s largest managed project to date is Europe’s first indigenous anti-ballistic missile defense system.  The €3 billion tri-nation production program was awarded funding by OCCAR in November 2003.  In October 2003, EU defense ministers backed ambitious plans to have their armed forces capable of working together by 2010.​[24]​  The plans were a response to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Secretary General Javier Solana’s long-standing view that the EU needs improved security and defense capabilities.  For the EU to have armed forces that were agile, flexible, deployable, and sustainable, member states would need to combine forces and focus on quality and increasing military spending.  
In June 2004, EU foreign ministers approved the creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA), designed to improve Europe’s military capabilities and support its security and defense policies.  The aim of the EDA is to help member states improve cooperation on R&D, develop defense capabilities, foster armaments cooperation, and coordinate Europe-wide purchasing and contracting of weapons systems.  Its small first year budget of €2 million will rise to €25 million in 2005.  Although the agency budget will require unanimity, Secretary General Solana managed to secure agreement from ministers that as many decisions as possible will be taken by majority voting.​[25]​  As in most of the EU’s defense-related initiatives, Britain and France played instrumental roles in establishing the EDA.  For France, the EDA is a platform to create a European defense manufacturing base, supported by more spending on R&D and with contract preferences for European firms.  For Britain, the EDA is a forum less for industrial policy than for improving the military capabilities of member states – an objective shared by NATO.  Unfortunately, this divergence in views may not be healthy for the EDA’s long-term viability.
While BAE Systems, EADS, and Thales have supported the creation of such an agency, arguing that only through consolidating spending and research budgets can EU countries compete with an ever-rising US defense budget, their chief executives issued a joint statement warning that the agency risks becoming ‘a fig leaf to cover the nakedness of any real efforts to improve European defence’ unless it is given real power from the outset.​[26]​  The firms would like the EDA to identify holes in military capabilities and push member states to increase funding to fill the shortfalls.  In addition, they want the EDA to have a modest budget to coordinate research spending, and to have the authority to break down internal barriers to the defense trade.  More controversially, they also call on the EDA to help protect Europe’s defense industrial base.  While not advocating a ‘Fortress Europe,’ they also do not want ‘indigenous defence technology overtaken or dependence on foreign technologies [to] become a necessity, especially where technology transfer terms are very restrictive’ – a clear reference to US export regimes.  Still, many European executives understand the benefits of gaining access to US defense technologies.  In November 2003, Philippe Camus, joint chief executive of EADS, called on European governments to step up R&D in advanced technologies by pressing forward with a European defense procurement and research agency, and to foster greater transatlantic cooperation in the defense industry.​[27]​  He also said that both the European and North American industry associations were now united in encouraging their governments to open up ‘the playing field for cooperation and competition,’ adding that transatlantic allies should foster an environment in which industrial partners can focus on delivering the most advanced systems in the most cost-efficient manner.  This is particularly important to Camus, since a consequence of the wave of consolidations and mergers in the late 1990s is that there are now fewer players of true global scale, thereby making it more important to promote industrial cooperation and strategic partnerships for competition to be maintained and for innovation to push the sector forward.
While the EU does not have any equivalent to the proposed ‘Buy America’ defense procurement rules, member states have kept weapons procurement and other purchases related to the production of war material outside of the EU’s open procurement rules governing virtually every other area of national government purchases.  The EU’s competition and trade policies also have been circumscribed to some extent when applied to the defense sector.  On the political side, member countries have pledged themselves to creating a rapid reaction force that could deploy troops for humanitarian or crisis intervention.  Such initiatives have influenced national government procurement decisions, particularly the interest in developing cargo and troop transport capacities.
	European governments are showing a growing inclination to procure from European companies, which is upsetting some US defense firms that could often rely on steady sales to US allies.  Airbus’s military subsidiary beat Boeing and Lockheed Martin to win a €20 billion contract to supply seven European countries with 180 new military transport aircraft – the A400M.​[28]​  But the most important test came in January 2004, when the UK Ministry of Defence opted to spend $23 billion on refueling aircraft from EADS.​[29]​  The 27-year contract was a major blow to Boeing, which has a near monopoly on tanker aircraft, and to BAE, which had teamed up with the US firm since it had expected it to win the competition.  The EADS-headed consortium included Rolls-Royce, which will manufacture the tankers’ engines, and Thales, which will produce much of the avionics in factories in Britain.  Losing the UK contract would have effectively shut Airbus and EADS out of the tanker market.  While the actual factors determining the outcome of the decision may never be known, it is likely that national industrial issues played a major role.  The Airbus-led team, AirTanker, emphasized that its A330s are partly built in the UK and half of all new planes and 90 percent of conversions of the old aircraft used for their bid will be built in the UK.  AirTanker claimed that 7,500 jobs would be added or sustained if their bid was picked, while Boeing’s team could claim just 5,000.  In another example, the British Ministry of Defence in 2003 selected Thales to design a new aircraft carrier.  Perhaps as a consequence, France and Britain agreed in June 2004 to cooperate in building their next generation aircraft carriers.​[30]​
	As has been their practice since the SEA, the European Parliament and especially the European Commission have tried harder than the Council to develop a European industrial base.​[31]​  In its most recent statement on the subject, the Commission argues that, ‘Strengthening the industrial and market situation of European defence companies will greatly improve the EU’s ability to fulfill the Petersberg tasks in the accomplishment of ESDP.  It will also benefit collective defence by strengthening Europe’s contribution to NATO’.​[32]​  To achieve this goal, the Commission proposed action in the areas of: standardization; monitoring of defense related industries; intra-community transfers; competition policy; harmonized procurement rules; closer cooperation on the export control of dual-use goods; and R&D.
	At the political level, then, European governments have a mixed record.  On the one hand, they seem more willing to see Europe’s defense industry strengthen vis-à-vis US firms, but they are less committed to institutionalizing these goals within the EU, OCCAR, or NATO.  It is too early to say whether EDA will have a significant impact on Europe’s industrial base, but prior EU attempts in this area have been disappointing.

TRANSATLANTIC OR BIPOLAR?
Both political and economic factors will determine the direction of transatlantic collaboration in the defense sector.  The level and form of defense spending is one of the most critical factors (see Table 3).  While the Bush administration increased US defense spending to among the highest amounts since the end of World War II (although not nearly as high when measured as a percentage of gross domestic product), it is not clear that this amount of spending can continue.  Gradually rising interest rates, large federal budget deficits, and perhaps most importantly a shift in public opinion away from spending on defense may push Washington to reduce military spending.  Meanwhile, Europe has slashed defense spending since 1989, and has done little to increase it since 9-11 or the Iraq War.  Advocates of ESDP as well as US officials have called on European governments to increase defense spending for several years.  An increase in spending would serve to strengthen Europe’s defense industry, assuming the additional funds were allocated toward equipment purchases and wisely spent by OCCAR and EDA.  European firms would then be in a better position to negotiate with US firms, should they opt for enhancing transatlantic ties.  Alternatively, they might find it more attractive to focus on Europe, especially if EDA gives preferences to European firms.
	One indication that Europe may be opting for the bipolar path is the political capital expended on the Galileo project – a joint undertaking by the EU and the European Space Agency.​[33]​  Europe’s alternative to the US Global Positioning System (GPS), Galileo was given the go-ahead by European governments in May 2003 who agreed to fund the €3.6 billion project.  The target is to have 27 satellites fully operational by 2008.  Galileo is not a solely European project, as China has agreed to invest €230 million in the collaboration, and India and Israel among other countries are also lobbying to participate.  Such countries are barred from collaboration on GPS since it is largely a military system run by the Pentagon.  While it certainly has technological merits and provides economic benefits, Galileo’s foundation lies in the politics of the EU and ESDP.  The EU views Galileo as a move away from dependence on the Pentagon’s GPS, and a step towards a common defense.  It is telling that non-European countries have been included in, or may yet join, Galileo.  Their involvement reduces funding requirements from European defense budgets.  The US GPS system is closed to outsiders for security reasons.  The view that the US stresses security concerns over economics in its arms production, whereas the Europeans are struggling to finance core military capabilities, contains a good deal of credence in the case of satellite navigation.  
While outright transatlantic mergers may be difficult to pull off, more traditional collaborations on large weapons systems are still viable.  While it has been long common for companies to team up when submitting bids, especially as a means to gain access to a market that for political reasons would otherwise be closed, transatlantic alliances contain their own set of problems.  The most serious is technology transfer.  The Pentagon does not trust many non-US defense firms with state-of-the-art technologies, fearing that such know-how may end up in the hands of enemies.  Another problem with such collaborations is the demand by governments participating in such projects that companies in their countries should get a certain proportion of the associated work.  For example, Norway, one of eight countries partnering on the $244 billion F-35 fighter jet project, has threatened to pull out if project manager Lockheed Martin does not help Norway’s local industries secure work on the aircraft.​[34]​  By contributing funds for developing the plane in its early stages, the expectation of participating countries like Norway is that they will gain access to technology and production.  
	Blame for letting political tensions spill over into defense industrial matters does not rest entirely with the US.  The EU is considering ending its arms embargo on China.  Imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, France and Germany among others would like to see the resumption of arms sales to the world’s largest weapons importing country.  However, in May 2004 the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee approved legislation that would impose new export restrictions on sales of US defense and sensitive technologies to any country selling arms to China.​[35]​  In addition, the committee adopted an amendment that would bar the Pentagon for five years from doing any business with a company that sells arms to China, a prohibitive penalty for European defense firms.  
	US administration officials find themselves in a difficult situation.​[36]​  An easing of restrictions on the sales of military equipment to close US allies would enhance the inter-operability of US, NATO, and other allied forces – a goal that US officials have set since discovering the weaknesses of European forces during the 1991 Gulf War.  On the other hand, the US is sensitive to the security concerns of Taiwan and other East Asian countries, and opposes any initiative that would strengthen significantly China’s military capabilities.  House Republicans in particular are putting pressure on the administration’s efforts to ease controls on sales of military goods to Europe, and any weakening of European restrictions on arms sales to China would strengthen their position.  While this case can be viewed on one level as a domestic dispute between the legislative and executive branches, the fact that US policy on transatlantic arms production and sales is so fractured and contentious hampers efforts to promote collaboration and is a harbinger of continued confrontation in the short term. 
	Despite these formidable obstacles, there are signs that a transatlantic defense industrial base is feasible.  General Electric announced in November 2003 that it planned to buy a minority stake in Snecma, once the French government launches its partial privatization of the company.​[37]​  Still, acquisitions in the short-term are likely to remain small.  The main transatlantic deals in 2003 were the acquisition of two European producers of aircraft engines, FiatAvio and MTU Aero Engines, by US companies (The Carlyle Group and Kohlberg Kravis, respectively), and General Dynamics’ acquisition of the Austrian producer of military vehicles, Steyr Spezialfahrzeug.​[38]​  Most of the investment flows have gone from the US to Europe.  European acquisitions of US-based companies were much smaller deals, primarily by British companies.
The pattern in recent years often has been characterized by high expectations of an impending union between key US and European defense firms that falls just short of consummation.  General Dynamics considered a merger with BAE Systems in 2003, as Boeing and Lockheed Martin had previously.​[39]​  For BAE Systems, such a merger would have allowed the company to expand its business with the US government, where it already generates almost a quarter of its revenues, and gain greater access to US technologies.  For General Dynamics, a union with BAE Systems would fill in its military aerospace and shipbuilding businesses.  However, the negotiations broke down after BAE Systems refused to sell its profitable and fast-growing North American operations.  This suggests the difficulty that General Dynamics would have had to sell a full-blown merger to US government officials, who might be wary of technologies slipping beyond their full control.
For US firms looking for opportunities abroad, European companies seeking to protect markets can be a bigger problem than European politicians.  General Dynamics boldly tried to acquire the UK’s armored-vehicle maker Alvis PLC in early 2004.​[40]​  The US firm had received regulatory approval from the EU and Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry.  But in June, BAE Systems offered to pay almost $100 million more than General Dynamics’s $556 million bid, and the Alvis board withdrew its recommendation to shareholders that they accept the General Dynamics bid.  With the Alvis acquisition, General Dynamics would have been one of the top three armor vehicle makers in Europe, along with GIAT of France and Germany’s Krauss-Maffei.  For General Dynamics, the acquisition was about a strategic plan to broaden the company’s global presence.​[41]​  Although, in the end, this case turned out to be another example of national rather than transnational consolidation, it is significant that Nick Prest, Alvis chairman, could say that Alvis executives briefed the Ministry of Defense of the likely General Dynamics acquisition ‘as a matter of courtesy.’  This is an indication that firms – not governments – are calling many of the shots at this stage of transatlantic dealmaking.

CONCLUSION
Promoting transatlantic defense industry links is not a panacea for the larger issue of establishing a defense industrial base that can develop new technologies and sell them to the Pentagon and European defense ministries at competitive prices.  That can in all likelihood be achieved more easily by opening procurement to all bidders.  That means persuading the Pentagon (and Congress) to award more contracts to European firms.  It also means giving the EU’s EDA real responsibilities and decision-making powers in procuring weapons systems for member states – a move which would curb the dirigiste traditions of certain governments.  Such recommendations will face significant opposition on both sides of the Atlantic.
A possible problem for US defense firms is that Bush administration foreign policy actions have caused anti-American sentiment in some markets.  In Europe, countries that opposed the Iraq War will very likely opt for European-produced weapons systems over US products whenever possible.  US laws that already strongly favor domestic defense firms now are being used by US companies to fend off foreign competition.​[42]​  Sikorsky employed such a strategy in its competition with Augusta-Westland to replace the president’s fleet of helicopters.  Although Sikorsky’s strategy proved unsuccessful, such tactics could prove risky if European governments retaliate by limiting purchases of US defense exports.  On the other hand, Control Risks, a UK-based international security consultancy, claims that US defense companies were important business winners in 2003 due to the success of their products during the first month of the Iraq War.​[43]​  The lesson here is that, despite the superiority of many US military items, politics may trump sound economics.
Within the EU, a growing chorus of voices is calling for a single, competitive market in armaments that is treated in much the same way as other economic sectors.  As the European Commission succinctly put it, ‘[T]he survival of a European defence industrial base able to support the ESDP will depend on successful national and trans-European consolidation of the industry as well as transatlantic partnerships between companies.’​[44]​  But it will be the intergovernmental Council – not the Commission – that will have the final word on this subject, and particularly how ESDP will shape the EU’s relationship with NATO.
At the national level, key European governments remain relatively hostile to acquisitions by US firms.  For example, the German government opposes takeovers of German military vehicles producers by US companies.​[45]​  The 2002 acquisition of the German shipyard Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) by One Equity Partners (OEP), a US institutional investor, led to fears of a sell out of the German arms industry.  These fears were ameliorated somewhat in 2004, when HDW was merged with the shipyards of Thyssen Krupp, with OEP’s stake reduced to 25 percent.  In France, partial ownership by the state and trusted shareholders (noyau dur) of defense companies makes acquisitions by US firms virtually impossible.  Consequently, such concerns – on both sides of the Atlantic – will be difficult to overcome in the near-term.
NATO’s position in this issue is ambiguous.  Currently, the alliance plays a minor role in shaping the defense industrial base.  Occasionally, NATO is responsible for awarding contracts, as it did in April 2004 when it awarded its largest defense contract in decades, a multi-billion euro fleet of surveillance aircraft, to a consortium led by EADS and that included Northrop Grumman.​[46]​  But for the most part, NATO can do little to shape corporate restructuring, except indirectly by, for example, setting weapons performance goals and interoperability standards.  The more important question is whether NATO and the EU will come into conflict with each other over institutional mission and responsibility.  At a summit in London in November 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac said a European defense policy with its own military capability was perfectly compatible with NATO.​[47]​  The concern that many US policymakers have is whether an EU operational command cell would duplicate NATO structures.  Not only would this be a waste of the already limited budgets of European defense ministries, but it also would affect negatively NATO’s capabilities.




TABLE 1: Top Ten United States Defense Companies (2004)












1 Figures are in US$ million.
2 U.S. government sales only.
3 For fiscal year ending 3/31.
4 For fiscal year ending 1/31.





TABLE 2: Top Ten European Union Defense Companies (2004) 












1 Figures are in US$ million.  Currency conversions calculated using prevailing rates at the end of each firm’s fiscal year.
2 Does not include 2004 Alvis acquisition. 
3 EADS is 30.2% owned by DaimlerChrysler (Germany), 30.2% by SOGEADE (a French holding company comprised of Lagardère and the French state), and 5.5% by SEPI (Spanish state holding company).  Approximately 34% of EADS shares are held by the public.  EADS is registered in the Netherlands.
4 Purchase of AugustaWestland shares from GKN pending.
5 Fiscal year ending 7/31.
Source: Figures derived from Defense News Top 100 (http://www.defensenews.com/content/features/2004chart1.html (​http:​/​​/​www.defensenews.com​/​content​/​features​/​2004chart1.html​)).


TABLE 3: Defense Spending – United States and Europe1






European “Big Three” Total	123,681	107,920	-12.7%	98,124	-20.7%	99,336	-19.7%

1Figures are in US$ million, at constant 2000 prices and exchange rates are for calendar year.

Source: Figures derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php (​http:​/​​/​first.sipri.org​/​non_first​/​result_milex.php​).



























1 Figures are in US$ thousand and represent foreign military sales agreements.





















US % of Total	46.9%	39.0%	29.4%	26.5%	23.5%	33.5%

1 Figures are in US$ million at constant (1990) prices.
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